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 Logic 
 Sebastian Sunday  Gr è ve 
 In one of his fi nal manuscripts, Wittgenstein notes somewhat abruptly: 
 Th e question is: what is the logician to say here? (MS 174, 15v[2], trans. in OC,  § 68) 
 Logic played an important role in Wittgenstein ’ s work over the entire period 
of his philosophizing, from both the point of view of the philosopher of logic 
and that of the logician. Besides logical analysis, there is another kind of logical 
activity that characterizes Wittgenstein’s philosophical work aft er a certain point 
during his experience as a soldier and, later, as an offi  cer in the First World 
War  –  if not earlier. Th is other kind of logical activity has to do with what appears 
to be the literary form of Wittgenstein ’ s philosophical prose, and it is likely to be 
seen as the most modernist feature of his preoccupation with logic. 
 1  ‘ Logic ’ and  ‘ grammar ’ 
 Th e following early remark, from the  Tractatus (1922), gives expression to one of 
Wittgenstein ’ s most fundamental convictions concerning the relation between 
logic and philosophy: 
 Th e object of philosophy is the logical clarifi cation of thoughts. Philosophy is 
not a body of doctrine, but an activity. 
 A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. 
 Philosophy does not result in  ‘ philosophical propositions ’, but in the 
becoming-clear [ Klarwerden ] of propositions. (TLP,  § 4.112 1 ) 
 For example, I might be inclined to say that  ‘ systems of formal logic describe 
the logic of language ’. According to Wittgenstein ’ s conception of philosophy, it 
would be wrong to think that uttering such a sentence, as such, would be the 
1 Translations of the  Tractatus are taken from the Pears/McGuinness translation or the Ogden/
Ramsey one or both, without further indication. Translations have been emended where necessary, 
also without further indication. Th e same applies to the Bartlett translation of Frege ’ s  ‘ Ü ber die 
wissenschaft liche Berechtigung einer Begriff sschrift  ’. 
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result of philosophy (as it were,  philosophical propositions ). Rather, according to 
this conception, my utterance of this sentence marks the beginning of the real 
philosophical work that is needed. For what we, as philosophers, have to do now 
is to make clear  – to ourselves as much as to whoever might care to fi nd out  – 
what exactly might be meant by the utterance of this sentence. Th is activity is 
what Wittgenstein calls  the logical clarifi cation of thoughts . 
 Wittgenstein mainly uses the term  ‘ logic ’ in two common ways: namely, either 
to speak about a system of formal logic such as Aristotle ’ s logic, Frege ’ s concept-
script or Russell ’ s  Principia Mathematica (i.e. the method of investigation), or to 
speak of how language in general, one language in particular or specifi c expressions, 
propositions, words, concepts, etc. function (i.e. the object of investigation). 
Many important issues in the philosophy of logic can be framed with regard 
to possible, or perhaps merely supposed, relations between logic as the method 
of investigation and logic as the object of investigation. In what sense are systems 
of formal logic about the logic of language? Is there only one correct system of 
formal logic or are there many? Here is a relatively late remark, from 1948, in 
which Wittgenstein discusses a related kind of issue: 
 Aristotelian logic brands a contradiction as a non-sentence, which is to be 
excluded from language. But this logic only deals with a very small part of the 
logic of our language. 
 (It is as if the fi rst geometrical system had been a trigonometry; and as if we 
now believed that trigonometry is the real basis for geometry, if not the whole of 
geometry.) (MS 137, 129 – 129v, trans. in LW I,  § 525) 
 According to Wittgenstein, there exists a general tendency to reify systems of 
logic or, what comes to the same,  ‘ to sublimate the logic of our language ’, as 
he puts it in section 38 of  Philosophical Investigations (cf.  § § 89, 94). In other 
words, what is at issue in the above passage is a tendency to misunderstand 
the normative character of formal logic in such a way, for instance, as to try to 
eliminate features of our ordinary language that do not accord with the rules 
of some system of formal logic  – even though these features of our ordinary 
language might in fact fulfi l genuine functions, which merely cannot be captured 
adequately by this particular set of rules. Against such reifying and sublimating 
attitudes, Wittgenstein reminds us that sometimes expressions such as  ‘ Yes and 
no ’ fulfi l a vital communicative function  qua being contradictory, for example, 
in replying to the question  ‘ Do you love me? ’, or  ‘Are you a Marxist? ’.2 
2 It should be noted that such a reminder carries no particular commitment to logical pluralism.
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 Th e following passage from the Preface of the  Tractatus contains one of the 
most salient instances of one of the two main ways in which Wittgenstein uses 
the term  ‘ logic ’ : 
 Th e book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows  – as I believe  – that 
the posing [ Fragestellung ] of these problems stems from misunderstanding the 
logic of our language. (TLP, Preface) 
 Wittgenstein thinks that there is a characteristic dimension to philosophy that 
is displayed in a powerful, and dangerous, tendency to talk nonsense without 
being aware of it. 
 In later writings, Wittgenstein speaks less frequently of the  ‘ logic ’ of our 
language. Instead, he now oft en speaks of the grammar of our language. More 
frequently still, Wittgenstein now speaks of the ‘grammar’ of particular words 
and expressions. 3 
 Th e shift  towards greater attention to the specifi c features of particular 
words and expressions in the later period corresponds to, among other things, 
Wittgenstein ’ s growing appreciation of just how diffi  cult a task it is to describe 
the logic of language at all clearly, even in what appear to be the simplest cases. 
Th roughout this transition, Wittgenstein remains committed to the same basic 
principle, however: if we want to understand the logic (or grammar) of language, 
we have to look at how language is actually used in life. He writes: 
 In philosophy the question,  ‘ What do we actually use this word, this sentence 
for? ’ leads to valuable insights, time and time again. (TLP,  § 6.211) 4 
 In the course of his steadily growing awareness of the diffi  culties one faces in 
trying to answer this kind of question and increasing focus on the contextualized 
particularity of individual cases of language use, the later Wittgenstein undertook 
a substantial elaboration of the methods of formal logic that he employed. In 
this connection it is also important to note how variously the later Wittgenstein 
3 In Philosophical Investigations, the only two instances of the  ‘ of our language ’ -variety of  ‘ logic ’ occur 
in sections 38 and 93. Th e corresponding use of  ‘ grammar ’ occurs in sections 29, 122, 295, 354, 
371, 373, 497, 520 and 528, inter alia. However, see also e.g. MS 169, 72v, trans. in LW II, §44:  ‘ Bad 
infl uence of Aristotelian logic. Th e logic of language is immeasurably more complicated than it 
looks. ’ For instances of  ‘ grammar ’ of particular words and expressions, see e.g. PI,  § § 35 ( ‘ to mean ’, 
 ‘ imagine ’ ), 150 ( ‘ know ’,  ‘ can ’,  ‘ be able ’,  ‘ understand ’ ), 165 ( ‘ a quite particular ’ ), 182 ( ‘ to fi t ’,  ‘ be able ’, 
 ‘ understand ’ ), 187 ( ‘ know ’,  ‘ to mean ’ ), 199 ( ‘ to follow a rule ’ ), and also 257, 339, 492, 657, 660, 664 
and 693. Cf.  § 345, for an equivalent use of  ‘ logic ’. For more on grammar, see also Hutchinson and 
Read, this volume. 
4 For a detailed discussion of the development of Wittgenstein ’ s attitude towards  ‘ ordinary language ’, 
see Conant (manuscript), ‘Early and Later Wittgenstein on the Ordinary, on Language, and on 
Ordinary Language’. 
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uses the attribute  ‘ grammatical ’ in characterizing his philosophical methods. He 
speaks of grammatical perspective, analysis, sentences, structure, remarks, etc. 
Finally, like  ‘ logic ’, he also sometimes uses  ‘ grammar ’ in the sense of a technique 
or discipline that he engages in (see e.g. PI,  § 496). 
 2 Devices to avoid misunderstanding 
 Frege had constructed his concept-script ( Begriff sschrift  ) not as some kind of ideal 
that ordinary language would have to be brought in line with but as something 
in response to, as he writes,  ‘ the lack of a device to avoid misunderstanding in 
others as well as errors in one ’ s own thinking [that] makes itself so oft en felt in 
the more abstract scientifi c disciplines ’. 5  ‘ May philosophers too, then, give some 
attention to the matter! ’ he added (160 [56]). Wittgenstein certainly did. 
 Th e signs, strings of signs or structures of signs in formal logic, which we 
manipulate according to the rules of the system, are signifi cantly diff erent 
from the sentences, or propositions, of our ordinary language. One essential 
diff erence can be seen as follows. If one wanted to conceive of formal strings 
of signs as something like logical  sentences that could be true or false, then on 
closer inspection one would fi nd that these  ‘ sentences ’ can fulfi l their function 
equally well when construed in the form of tautologies  – that is, when construed 
in such a way that they cannot be false. In the  Tractatus , Wittgenstein writes 6 : 
 6.12  If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are combined in a 
certain way, they must have certain structural properties. So their 
yielding a tautology when combined  in this way shows that they possess 
these structural properties. 
 … 
 6.121  Th e sentences of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions 
by combining them so as to form sentences that say nothing. 
 Th e fact that so-called logical sentences can, apparently, not be false, has led 
many to think that ‘logical sentences’ must therefore be true, hence, that they are 
5 G. Frege,  ‘ Ü ber die wissenschaft liche Berechtigung einer Begriff sschrift  ’,  Zeitschrift  f ü r Philosophie 
und philosophische Kritik 81 (1882), 48; trans. J. M. Bartlett, 1964,  ‘ On the Scientifi c Justifi cation of 
a Concept-script ’,  Mind 73, no. 290 (1964), 155.  
6 In addition to the passages that I have quoted, see also TLP,  § § 4.461, 6.1 – 6.111 and 6.1221. Russell 
expressed his agreement with this point in a letter to Wittgenstein dated 13 August 1919. For an 
example of the practical signifi cance of this point, see V. Halbach,  Th e Logic Manual (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 43ff . 
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necessary truths. On the other hand, it might seem doubtful whether one should 
speak of logical  ‘ sentences ’ at all. If logical sentences cannot be false, then can 
they be true? Perhaps it would be wiser to avoid this analogy between language 
and systems of formal logic. 7 Wittgenstein continues: 
 It follows from this that we can actually do without logical sentences; for in a 
suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal properties of propositions 
by mere inspection. (TLP,  § 6.122) 
 Th e passage ends with an example of such a notation:  ‘ In cases where no 
generality-sign occurs, ’ Wittgenstein explains,  ‘ one can employ the following 
illustrative method ’. Namely, instead of writing ~(p.~q) and its truth table, for 
instance, we can draw the following diagram: 
 (TLP,  § 6.1203) 
 Let us suppose that this diagram represents a correct truth-functional analysis of 
what someone meant when they uttered the following words:  ‘ It is not true that 
Wittgenstein threatened and Popper did not provoke. ’ 
 Th e diagram now lets us see that what the person meant to say would be 
true even if it were actually true that Wittgenstein threatened, provided that it 
were also true that Popper provoked.8 So, perhaps, what the person meant to 
say could have been expressed more clearly by saying  ‘ Wittgenstein might have 
threatened, but Popper defi nitely provoked. ’ 
7 For discussion of the scope of Wittgenstein ’ s later concern with philosophical issues arising from 
supposed analogies between language and systems of formal logic, see W. Kienzler and S. S. Gr è ve, 
 ‘ Wittgenstein on G ö delian  “ Incompleteness, ” Proofs and Mathematical Practice: Reading  Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics , Part I, Appendix III, Carefully ’, in  Wittgenstein and the Creativity 
of Language , eds. S. S. Gr è ve and J. M á cha (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
8 Th e corresponding reading of the lines of the diagram starts from the bottom and sees the following 
connections: T – T p – T q.
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 Alternatively, using PM-notation, we can say that the person who uttered 
these words did not mean something of the form ~p.~q, for which their utterance 
could easily be mistaken. However, unlike PM-notation, the diagram illustrates 
the truth-functional structure of what was said without making use of anything 
that one might even be tempted to call logical  ‘ sentences ’. 
In one sense, Wittgenstein’s diagrammatic notation simply follows Frege ’ s 
guideline for (two-dimensional) logical notations. Frege writes: 
 [A well-constructed logical notation] will have to be entirely diff erent from all 
word-languages in order to make full use of the specifi c advantages of visual 
signs.  … Such brevity must thereby be striven for that the two-dimensionality of 
the writing surface can be well exploited for the perspicuity of the representation. 
(Frege, On Scientifi c Justifi cation, 53, 55) 9 
 Furthermore, the logician ’ s construction of suitable notations can itself be 
regarded as an act of philosophical clarifi cation. As Wittgenstein writes  ‘ we have 
the right logical point of view once all is in order in our sign-language ’ (TLP, 
 § 4.1213). Aft er all, it is in virtue of the skill of the logician as a philosopher that 
the particular act of logical clarifi cation can succeed without at the same time 
provoking a number of puzzling questions that would bring itself into question – 
for example, questions concerning the semantic or epistemic status of notational 
features. Are tautologies of classical logic, such as ~(p.~p), necessary truths about 
the world? Do elementary propositions (or atomic facts or possible worlds etc.) 
exist? Th e diagram fulfi ls its function not only without appearing to formulate 
logical  ‘ sentences ’, but also without making any use of logical constants  – such 
as, in PM-notation, v,  É , ~,  º , .)  – whose nature has been the subject of endless 
controversies among philosophers of logic. In the diagram, there is just  the 
line connecting various  T s and  F s. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s diagrammatic 
notation resembles the Sheff er Stroke and Wittgenstein ’ s own N-operator (see 
 § 5.131 and  § § 5.502, 5.51 and 6, respectively). In fact, the notational minimalism 
of the line seems to go beyond that of the other two notational devices. 10 
 Someone might object to this as follows:  ‘ Th is diagrammatic notation 
is nothing but a crude equivalent to more elaborate logics. In particular, it 
fails to make explicit the system of rules according to which it operates. 
9 In this respect, Frege ’ s notation is unrivalled by Russell ’ s. 
10 See also TLP,  § 5.4:  ‘ Here it becomes manifest that there are no  “ logical objects ” or  “ logical constants ” 
(in Frege ’ s and Russell ’ s sense) ’.’ See further  § § 5.441, 5.53 and 5.531 – 5.5321, and the related proposal 
of a solution to Russell ’ s Paradox in  § 3.333. 
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 Principia Mathematica , for instance, does a much better job at formulating 
these  “ primitive propositions ” of logic. ’ However, is this not merely the call to 
construct yet another logical system, in order to model the one we already have? 
But to whose benefi t? For, surely, to the extent that the diagram suffi  ciently 
clarifi ed the relevant thought, the job of the logician has been done. Not every 
logician and philosopher has to be a meta-logician at the same time. 
 Similarly, general worries over allegedly implicit rules in this diagrammatic 
analysis seem quite out of place. Compare the following passage from the Tractatus: 
 If  p follows from  q , I can make an inference from  q to  p , deduce  p from  q .  … 
 ‘ Laws of inference ’, which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the works of 
Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfl uous. (TLP,  § 5.132) 
 In other words, once the philosopher of logic begins to question (formalize) 
the justifi cation of inferences, the asking (formalizing) likely never ends. For, 
the asking might continue,  ‘ What, in turn, is the justifi cation of this  “ law of 
inference ” ? ’ etc. etc. 11 
 Now, if constructing logical notations is itself an act of clarifi cation  – in 
that logical notation is supposed to help clarify problematic propositions while 
keeping philosophical contention, or the appearance of it, to a minimum  –  then, 
the logician or philosopher may ask, how might logical problems be solved 
without thereby engendering new ones?  Arguably, the later Wittgenstein ’ s 
language-games are designed to do just that; thus, they constitute a logic for 
philosophy  ‘ so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring  itself in 
question ’ (PI,  § 133). Since  ‘ the very nature of the investigation  … compels us to 
travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide fi eld of thought, ’ Wittgenstein 
writes in the Preface to the  Investigations ,  ‘ this book is really just an album. ’ 
Th ere is, therefore, more than one way of reading the text  – there are, as it 
were, diff erent ways of browsing the album. 12 And one way of reading it sees 
Wittgenstein’s language-games as constituting a new kind of philosophical logic. 
Th e space constraints of the present text do not permit us to develop even the 
outlines of this, but trying to see the connections in what Wittgenstein writes 
in sections 5, 7, 81 and 130 of  Philosophical Investigations might give the reader 
11 Cf. L. Carroll,  ‘ What the Tortoise Said to Achilles ’,  Mind 4, no. 14 (1895): 278 – 80. 
12 For a detailed discussion on the philosophical signifi cance of the album structure of the  Investigations , 
see Alois Pichler, ‘Th e Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style, Th erapy, Nachlass’, in 
Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, eds. Kanterian Kahane and 
Oskari Kuusela (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Alois Pichler, ‘Wittgenstein and Us “Typical Western 
Scientists”’, in Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language, eds. Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub 
Mácha (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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some indication of what to look out for when next reading the book. 13 Here 
it is furthermore noteworthy that Wittgenstein uses the term  ‘ language-game ’, 
like ‘logic’ and ‘grammar’, not only to speak of a technical instrument of logical 
analysis but also to refer to our language as a whole or certain parts of it, thus 
stressing the interwovenness of language with life and, in particular, action  – 
insights into which guided Wittgenstein’s development as a philosopher and as 
a logician. 
 3 Logical writing in the  Tractatus and in the  Investigations 
 If we intend to take Wittgenstein at his word when he tells us at the end of the 
 Tractatus that his sentences will be recognized, apparently without exception, 
as nonsense by those who understand him, then we face the diffi  culty of how to 
explain that at least some of those sentences, far from seeming to be nonsense, 
quite defi nitely have something important to tell us about logic. One possible 
explanation may be sought in connection with what might be described as 
the remarkable unity of logic, aesthetics and philosophy that can be found in 
the book. 
 Let us begin by reminding ourselves of that notorious sentence towards the 
end of the book, where Wittgenstein writes:  ‘ My sentences serve as elucidations 
in the following way: whoever understands me, fi nally recognises them as 
nonsensical ’ (TLP,  § 6.54). 
 If the sentences are to serve as  ‘ elucidations ’, then all the nonsense that 
makes up the bulk of the book must nevertheless fulfi l some function. 
However, the author off ers no explanation of how this might be. Yet, if we 
take the author of the  Tractatus at his word  – in particular, if we take him as 
trying to be clear and not to be needlessly enigmatic  – then 6.54 will appear as 
neither obscure nor paradoxical (though nevertheless diffi  cult to grasp). If we 
understand him, he says, we will recognize his sentences as nonsensical. It is 
not clear to what extent the converse conditional may also be true. However, 
in Wittgenstein ’ s absence, it seems promising to assume the following as our 
principle: if we see how all of the sentences of the Tractatus from 1 to 6.53, 
13 I discuss this topic in a larger manuscript from which the present text has been excerpted. See also 
O. Kuusela,  ‘ Th e Method of Language-Games as a Method of Logic ’,  Philosophical Topics 42, no. 2 
(2014): 129–60; and  Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Wittgenstein ’ s Philosophy of Logic in Relation 
to Frege, Russell, Carnap and Others (manuscript). 
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and possibly 7, can  ‘ simply be nonsense ’ (Preface), then we will understand its 
author. Furthermore, someone who understands him in this way, the author 
of the book says, is someone for whom his sentences have acted as a one-way 
 ‘ ladder ’  – someone, as he puts it, who  ‘ has climbed through them  – on them  – 
beyond them ’ ( § 6.54). 
 Th e climbing itself must be left  to each individual reader, but the function that 
all this nonsense fulfi ls can be formulated as follows. Th e nonsense of which the 
author of the  Tractatus speaks in 6.54 is one long series of examples of nonsense 
that  ‘ stems from misunderstanding the logic of our language ’ (Preface). Th is is 
an apparently simple structure, but the amounts of  ‘ climbing ’ that are actually 
necessary in order to understand its point have proved to be immense. 
 One might think that the Tractatus begins with rather more patent nonsense  – 
 ‘ Th e world is all that is the case ’ (§1) and so on  – and that it continues with 
nonsense that is increasingly latent, such as the so-called picture theory and 
the saying/showing distinction. However, according to the author of the book  – 
especially what he writes in 6.54 and in the Preface  – it is all one  big bunch of 
nonsense that we need to recognize as such. Each and every sentence from 1 to 
6.53, and possibly 7, is nonsense, the author tells us, because it is the nonsense 
of someone who was driven by his misunderstanding the logic of our language 
(namely the author himself). So, in his previous attempts to understand the logic 
of our language, his actually misunderstanding it made him develop inconsistent 
theories of the  ‘ sublime ’ nature of logic, including a large number of apparent 
theorems concerning metaphysics, ethics, mathematics, the meaning of life and 
more besides. 
 Reading ‘nonsense’ in 6.54 in this way does not imply that any particular 
sentence of the book, when considered in relative isolation, need be nonsense 
at all. In principle, they can all be made sense of. Having recognized how all 
sentences from 1 to 6.53, and possibly 7, are a big bunch of nonsense, one is free 
to do with the sentences of the  Tractatus as one pleases  – and  ‘ its purpose would 
be achieved if it gave pleasure to someone who read it with understanding, ’ 
(Preface)  – but, more importantly, we may also still use the sentences of the 
 Tractatus to ascribe particular thoughts to its author about logic and all other 
subjects treated in the book. 
 Th e fi nal four paragraphs of the Preface clearly imply that the sentences of the 
book may be of some worth beyond their function as  ‘ elucidations ’, that is, beyond 
their function as a bunch of nonsense. Beginning with the acknowledgement that 
 ‘ to the great works of Frege and the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell 
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I owe in large measure the stimulation of my thoughts ’, Wittgenstein speaks of 
a plurality of thoughts ( Gedanken ). And he says that, while he is  ‘ conscious of 
having fallen a long way short of what is possible ’ as regards the clarity of their 
expression,  ‘ the  truth of the thoughts communicated ’ seems to him  ‘ unassailable 
and defi nitive ’. 
 Th us, the author of the Tractatus wishes his work to be read twofold. On the 
one hand, he wishes his readers to see the sentences of the book as the expressions 
of his previous misunderstanding the logic of our language. On the other hand, 
he wishes his readers to see the true thoughts that he thinks his sentences may 
still communicate. So the book is composed in such a way that, in order to gain 
a comprehensive understanding of it, readers are required not merely to think 
through concisely stated views and arguments about logic and more or less related 
subjects but, at the same time, to engage in a good deal of actual logical clarifi cation 
in order to sort out the author’s confl icted relation to the very sentences that are 
supposed to communicate his views and arguments.  
 On his return to philosophy in 1929, Wittgenstein did exactly that. In fact, it 
is evident from historical sources, including correspondence that has recently 
been made available, that Wittgenstein had never really stopped taking an 
active interest in what, at one time or another, he believed the true thoughts 
in the  Tractatus to be. Eventually, in the text of  Philosophical Investigations , 
Wittgenstein’s continued work resulted in a written account of the kind of logic 
and philosophy of logic that his earlier self had only been able to gesture at.  
 Reading the  Investigations as teaching the technique of language-games as 
logic may generally not be the most obvious way of reading the book. One 
reason why this may be so is as follows. Insofar as it was Wittgenstein ’ s intention 
to develop a logic that could be maximally eff ective in solving philosophical 
problems while at the same time running a minimal risk of creating new ones (as 
briefl y argued in the previous section), the teaching of this new logic equally had 
to involve no more than the absolute minimum of controversial elements and, in 
particular, no general principles or rules of application. 
In section 71, Wittgenstein says that  ‘ one might explain what a game is ’ by 
giving various examples so that the other person may be able ‘to employ those 
examples in a particular way’. Th en he adds:  ‘ Here giving examples is not an 
 indirect way of explaining  – in default of a better one ’. I think that we should 
take this suggestion seriously with regard also to the way Wittgenstein explains 
what a language-game is, when the latter is understood as a logical device. 
 Wittgenstein could not have explained the logic of language-games by means of 
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general principles. For one thing, Wittgenstein did not formulate such general 
principles. Moreover, any attempt to teach this logic primarily by means of 
formulating general principles would arguably fail, because it really consists of 
a skill. And, given Wittgenstein’s outstanding mastery, for any ordinary human 
being acquiring this skill would appear to require a great deal of practice. In 
fact, unlike other logics the logic of language-games does not typically yield 
replicable results. Its general aim is, of course, always the same, namely the 
logical clarifi cation of thoughts. However, the specifi c language-games (objects 
of comparison), which it provides to that end, will vary not only with regard to 
the minutest details of whatever we are investigating but also with regard to the 
person who is seeking clarifi cation. 
 For example, let us suppose that in a philosophical discussion about other 
minds, someone tells us  ‘ I know what pain is only from my own case ’. Let us 
further suppose that we are unsure how exactly to understand this utterance 
and that our interlocutor fi nds it equally diffi  cult to see how we could possibly 
fail to grasp what he or she is trying to say. Perhaps here we will remember 
Wittgenstein ’ s  beetles , and quote as follows: 
 Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a  ‘ beetle ’. 
No one can ever look into anyone else ’ s box, and everyone says he knows what a 
beetle is only by looking at  his beetle. (PI,  § 293) 
 Our interlocutor may fi nd this revealing:  ‘ I see your point, if these people ’ s 
word  “ beetle ” had a use nonetheless, it would not be as the name of a thing. ’ 
Alternatively, our interlocutor may not fi nd this revealing:  ‘ So what? In such a 
scenario it would be quite possible for everyone to have something diff erent in 
their box and hence, yes, they too would know what a  “ beetle ” is only from their 
own case. ’ We, again, in our attempt to understand the original utterance, may 
fi nd either of these reactions useful, or we may not. If not, then we might try 
explaining our own view of how the language-game is supposed to work, or we 
might off er a diff erent object of comparison altogether  – perhaps the  sensation 
diary of section 258, or one of our own inventions  – and so on and so forth until, 
hopefully, all relevant propositions have become clear to us and we have, in this 
way, reached a better understanding with regard to both each other ’ s words and 
the things in question. 
To reiterate, the way in which such an improved understanding might be 
achieved will usually depend on very specifi c features concerning various 
parameters. Th ere are at least the following parameters: the utterance or 
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expression that we wish to clarify; the putatively expressed thought that we wish 
to grasp; the object that the thought is about, if there is any such object; and the 
subject who made use of the relevant expression in the fi rst place. Ultimately, it 
is this kind of particularism, which in one form or another characterizes all his 
later philosophy, that made it practically impossible for Wittgenstein to teach 
the logic of language-games in any more  ‘ direct ’ way than by examples. 14 
 Th e text of the Investigations has oft en been criticized for being ‘erratic’, 
‘pretentious’ or ‘oracular’. Th is seems wrong. Instead, we can appreciate the 
logical character of the text through which Wittgenstein had intended to present 
his new logic and his new philosophy. For the author of the Investigations, there 
was the diffi  culty of how to get his readers to pick up a certain logical activity 
from him without, as it were, telling them what it is  – so as to prevent the activity, 
which was designed to solve problems, from creating new ones. Furthermore, 
as a consequence of the particularist character of that which he wanted to get 
his readers to do, there was the diffi  culty of how to demonstrate to them that 
it is a good method  for them . Th is latter diffi  culty meant that Wittgenstein 
had to come up with some very powerful examples (language-games), that 
would fulfi l their clarifying function more or less immediately for as many 
individual thinkers as possible. Arguably, the shopkeeper (§1) and the builders 
(§2) are indeed such powerful examples. Wittgenstein’s numerous variations 
of language-games serve this purpose too. Dialogues accompany most of the 
language-games in the  Investigations , which off er discussions from diff erent 
perspectives. Finally, Wittgenstein added a good number of refl ections, analogies, 
metaphors, comparisons, etc. to further characterize the kinds of activity that 
he wants his readers to pick up from him.  Wittgenstein’s composition of the 
text of  Philosophical Investigations , including his employment of literary devices, 
constitutes an elaborate extended act of logical clarifi cation, because it forms an 
essential part of the exposition of the logic of language-games. 15 
14 For more on the dialectic between objective and subjective moments of Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
method, see S. S. Gr è ve,  ‘ Th e Importance of Understanding Each Other in Philosophy ’,  Philosophy 
90, no. 2 (2015): 213 – 39. 
15 I would like to thank Stefan Giesewetter, Wolfgang Kienzler, Oskari Kuusela, Anat Matar and Sarah 
Anna Szeltner for their comments on earlier draft s of this material. 
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